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SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE FORCING THEOREM, AND
TURNING PROPER CLASSES INTO SETS
PETER HOLY, REGULA KRAPF, AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
Abstract. We present three natural combinatorial properties for class forcing notions, which
imply the forcing theorem to hold. We then show that all known sufficent conditions for the
forcing theorem (except for the forcing theorem itself), including the three properties presented
in this paper, imply yet another regularity property for class forcing notions, namely that proper
classes of the ground model cannot become sets in a generic extension, that is they do not have
set-sized names in the ground model. We then show that over certain models of Go¨del-Bernays
set theory without the power set axiom, there is a notion of class forcing which turns a proper
class into a set, however does not satisfy the forcing theorem. Moreover, we show that the
property of not turning proper classes into sets can be used to characterize pretameness over
such models of Go¨del-Bernays set theory.
1. Introduction
While the forcing theorem is a provable property of set forcing notions, this is not the case for
notions of class forcing (see [HKL+16]). In this paper, we continue the work from [HKL+16] and
from [HKS17] by isolating further natural sufficient properties of class forcing notions that imply
the forcing theorem to hold. While one of them (approachability by projections) is only a minor
generalization of the principle of the same name from [HKL+16, Section 6], and has a somewhat
lengthy definition, the other two properties turn out to be equivalent to simple forcing properties.
That is, we will show the forcing theorem to be a consequence of either not adding new sets (the
set decision property), or of every new set being added by a set-sized complete subforcing (the set
reduction property).
We then show that all of the known sufficent conditions for the forcing theorem (except for
the forcing theorem itself), including the ones that we will introduce in this paper, also imply
that over models of Go¨del-Bernays set theory without the power set axiom, proper classes of the
ground model will not be turned into sets in a generic extension; for a notion of class forcing
P, we say that a proper class X of the ground model becomes a set in a P-generic extension if
there is a (set-sized) P-name σ and a P-generic filter G such that σG = X . Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, we then show that it is possible that a proper class can be turned into a set, by a
notion of class forcing which does not satisfy the forcing theorem. In fact, this property can even
be used to characterize pretameness over certain models of Go¨del-Bernays set theory. This latter
characterization continues a series of results in [HKS17, Theorem 1.12].
We will start the paper by introducing some basic definitions and notation in the next section.
This will essentially be the same basic setup as in [HKL+16] or in [HKS17].
2. Basic Definitions and Notation
We will work with transitive second-order models of set theory, that is models of the form
M = 〈M, C〉, where M is transitive and denotes the collection of sets of M, and C denotes the
collection of classes of M.1 We require that M ⊆ C, and that elements of C are subsets of M . We
call elements of C \M proper classes (of M). Classical transitive first-order models of set theory
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are covered by this approach, letting C be the collection of classes definable over 〈M,∈〉. The
theories that we will be working in will be fragments of Go¨del-Bernays set theory GB.
Notation. (1) GB− denotes the theory in the two-sorted language with variables for sets and
classes, with the set axioms provided by the axioms of ZF− with class parameters allowed in
the schemata of Separation and Collection, and the class axioms of extensionality, foundation
and first-order class comprehension (i.e. involving only set quantifiers). GB− enhanced with
the power set axiom is the common collection of axioms of GB. GBC− is GB− together with
the axiom postulating the existence of a set-like well-order, i.e. a global well-order whose
initial segments are set-sized.
(2) By a countable transitive model , we mean a transitive second-order model M = 〈M, C〉 such
that both M and C are countable in V.
Fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. By a notion of class forcing (for M)
we mean a partial order P = 〈P,≤P〉 such that P,≤P ∈ C. We will frequently identify P with its
domain P . In the following, we also fix a notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M.
We call σ a P-name if all elements of σ are of the form 〈τ, p〉, where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P.
We define MP to be the set of all P-names that are elements of M and define CP to be the set
of all P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of MP
simply P-names and we will call the elements of CP class P-names. If σ ∈ MP is a P-name, we
define
rankσ = sup{rank τ + 1 | ∃p ∈ P [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ]}
to be its name rank.
We say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M, if G meets every dense subset of P that is an
element of C. Given such a filter G and a P-name σ, we recursively define the G-evaluation of σ
as
σG = {τG | ∃p ∈ G [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ]},
and similarly we define ΓG for Γ ∈ CP. Moreover, if G is P-generic over M, then we set M [G] =
{σG | σ ∈MP} and C[G] = {ΓG | Γ ∈ CP}.
Given an L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, ~Γ), where ~Γ ∈ (C
P)n are class name parameters, p ∈ P
and ~σ ∈ (MP)m, we write p MP ϕ(~σ,
~Γ), if for every P-generic filter G over M with p ∈ G,
〈M [G],ΓG0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1〉 |= ϕ(σ
G
0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1,Γ
G
0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1).
A fundamental result in the context of set forcing is the forcing theorem. It consists of two parts,
the first one of which, the so-called definability lemma, states that the forcing relation is definable
in the ground model, and the second part, denoted as the truth lemma, says that every formula
which is true in a generic extension M [G] is forced by some condition in the generic filter G. In
the context of second-order models of set theory, this has the following natural generalization:
Definition 2.1. Let ϕ ≡ ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1, ~Γ) be an L∈-formula with class name parameters ~Γ ∈
(CP)n.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σm−1〉 ∈ P × (M
P)m | p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1, ~Γ)} ∈ C.
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈M
P, and every
filter G which is P-generic over M with
〈M [G],ΓG0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1〉 |= ϕ(σ
G
0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1,Γ
G
0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1),
there is p ∈ G with p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1,
~Γ).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability
lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M.
Note that in class forcing, the forcing theorem may fail even for atomic formulae ([HKL+16,
Theorem 1.3]). A crucial result is that if the definability lemma holds for one atomic formula,
then the forcing theorem holds for each L∈-formula with class name parameters (see [HKL
+16,
Theorem 4.3]).
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Definition 2.2. [Fri00, Chapter 2] A notion of (class) forcing P for M is pretame for M if for
every p ∈ P and for every sequence of dense subclasses 〈Di | i ∈ I〉 ∈ C of P with I ∈ M , there is
q ≤P p and 〈di | i ∈ I〉 ∈M such that for every i ∈ I, di ⊆ Di and di is predense below q.
The observation that pretame notions of class forcing satisfy the forcing theorem over any
model of GB− was first made by Maurice Stanley in his PhD thesis ([Sta84]), see also [Sta].
Moreover, Stanley observed ([Sta84],[Sta]) that pretameness characterizes the preservation of GB−
over models of GB. For a proof of both these results in our setting, consult [HKS17, Theorem 2.4
and Theorem 3.1].
In this paper, we will frequently make use of a particular collection of notions of class forcing:
For an ordinal γ ∈ OrdM and a proper class Y ∈ C, let Col(γ, Y )M denote the forcing notion that
adds a surjection from γ to Y with conditions of size less than the M -cardinality of γ over M, that
is the conditions of Col(γ, Y )M are partial functions from γ to Y with domain of size less than
the cardinality of γ in M , ordered by reverse inclusion. A variant of Col(γ, Y )M is provided by
the forcing notion Col∗(γ, Y )
M , which consists of those conditions p ∈ Col(γ, Y )M whose domain
is an ordinal. In Sections 3 and 5 we show that for every γ ∈ OrdM and for every Y ∈ C, both
Col(γ, Y )M and Col∗(γ, Y )
M satisfy the forcing theorem over M. 2
3. The Set Decision Property
In this section, we introduce a simple combinatorial property which implies the forcing theorem.
Moreover, we will show that this property exactly characterizes those notions of class forcing which
do not add any new sets.
Definition 3.1. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB− and let P be a notion
of class forcing for M. Let G˙ denote the canonical P-name for the generic filter.
(1) If p ∈ P and σ is a P-name, then we define the p-evaluation of σ by
σp = {τp | ∃q ∈ P [〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ ∀r ≤P p (r ‖P q)]}.
(2) Given conditions p and q in P, we write p ≤∗P q iff ∀r ≤P p (r ‖P q) (equivalently, p P q ∈ G˙).
Note that if P is separative, then p ≤∗P q if and only if p ≤P q.
(3) If A ⊆ P is a set of conditions and p ∈ P, we write p⊥PA or p ≤
∗
P A if ∀a ∈ A (p⊥Pa) or
∀a ∈ A (p ≤∗P a) respectively.
(4) If A ⊆ P is a set of conditions and p ∈ P, then p decides A (we write p ∼P A) if for every
a ∈ A, either p ≤∗P a or p⊥Pa.
(5) We say that P has the set decision property if for every p ∈ P and every set A ⊆ P in M ,
there is an extension q ≤P p of p such that q decides A.
Note that if p decides A, then p decides for every condition in A whether it lies in the generic
filter or not, i.e. p decides G˙ ∩ A.
A natural example of forcing notions with the set decision property are the (strategically)
<Ord-closed forcing notions, i.e. notions of forcing which are <κ-(strategically) closed for every
cardinal κ. We will leave the adaption of the example below to the case of strategically <Ord-
closed notions of forcing (and also the task of giving a precise definition of this property) to the
reader, as it is straightforward and we will not make use of any such property in this paper.
Example 3.2. Assuming that M is a model of GBC−, then every <Ord-closed notion of class
forcing P for M has the set decision property: Let p ∈ P and let A ⊆ P be a set of conditions.
Using choice, we can enumerate A as {ai | i < κ} for some cardinal κ. Inductively, we define a
sequence 〈pi | i < κ〉 of conditions such that for every i < j < κ, pj ≤P ai, or pj⊥Pai.
• Let p0 = p.
• Assume that pi has already been defined. If pi ‖P ai, then pick pi+1 that is stronger than
both pi and ai, using the existence of a global well-order. Otherwise, put pi+1 = pi.
• For a limit ordinal α, we use <Ord-closure of P and the global well-order to pick pα
stronger than pi for all i < α.
2Note that for γ = ω and Y = OrdM , this is verified in [Fri00, Proposition 2.25], and also follows from more
general results in [HKL+16, Lemma 2.2, Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.4].
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Now let q ∈ P be a condition stronger than every pi for i < κ. By construction, q decides A.
Example 3.3. Let γ ∈ OrdM and Y ∈ C a proper class. Then the forcing notion P = Col∗(γ, Y )
M
satisfies the set decision property: Suppose that A ∈ M is a subset of P and p ∈ P. Let β =
dom(p) ∈ OrdM . Now note that by assumption, X =
⋃
q∈A range(q) ∈M and since Y is a proper
class, there is y ∈ Y \X . Then q = p ∪ {〈β, y〉} decides A.
Definition 3.4. Given a notion of class forcing P and a P-name σ, we define the conditions
appearing in (the transitive closure of) σ by induction on name rank as
tc(σ) =
⋃
{{p} ∪ tc(τ) | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
Lemma 3.5. Every class forcing P for M with the set decision property satisfies the forcing
theorem and does not add new sets, that is M [G] =M whenever G is P-generic over M.
Proof. By [HKL+16, Theorem 4.3], to verify the forcing theorem it is enough to check that the
definability lemma holds for “v0 = v1”. Let σ, τ ∈M
P. Let A = tc(σ ∪ τ) and let p ∈ P. Then by
the set decision property p P σ = τ if and only if ∀q ≤P p (q ∼P A→ q P σ = τ). But if q ∼P A
and q ∈ G then σq = σG (this in particular implies that σG ∈ M and hence that P does not add
new sets), thus we obtain q P σ = τ iff σ
q = τq. Consequently, p P σ = τ can be defined by
∀q ≤P p (q ∼P A→ σ
q = τq). 
Lemma 3.6. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M which adds no new sets. Then P has the
set decision property.
Proof. Let A ⊆ P be a set of conditions in M and let p ∈ P. We have to find q ≤P p such that
q ∼P A. Assume for a contradiction that no such q exists.
Enumerate (in V) all elements of C that are dense subsets of P by 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉 and all subsets
of A which are elements of M by 〈xn | n ∈ ω〉. Let σ = {〈aˇ, a〉 | a ∈ A}. We will find a P-
generic filter G such that σG 6∈ M , which clearly contradicts our assumption on P. For this we
define a decreasing sequence of conditions 〈qn | n ∈ ω〉 below p and a sequence 〈an | n ∈ ω〉 of
conditions in A. Let q0 = p. Given qn, note that by our assumption it cannot be the case that
qn ≤
∗
P xn and qn⊥P(A \ xn). Hence there is an ∈ A such that either an ∈ xn and qn 6≤
∗
P an or
an /∈ xn and qn ‖P an. In the first case we pick r ≤P qn such that r⊥Pan. In the second case, we
strengthen qn to r ≤P qn, an. Now take qn+1 ≤P r such that qn+1 ∈ Dn. Finally, this means that
G = {q ∈ P | ∃n ∈ ω (qn ≤P q)} is a generic filter. But since P doesn’t add new sets and since
1P P σ ⊆ Aˇ, there must be some n ∈ ω such that σ
G = xn. But we have that either an ∈ xn
and an⊥Pqn+1, thus an /∈ σ
G, or an /∈ xn but qn+1 ≤P an implying that an ∈ σ
G. We have thus
reached a contradiction. 
Putting together Lemmata 3.5 and 3.6 we obtain
Corollary 3.7. Every class forcing which does not add new sets satisfies the forcing theorem.
In a series of two blog posts ([Git13]), Victoria Gitman claims to show (as a result of discussions
with Joel Hamkins) that class forcing that does not add new sets always satisfies the forcing
theorem, at least in case the notion of forcing under consideration is <Ord-strategically closed.
However in her setup, she allows only for canonical names (or in fact, constant symbols) for sets
(and her class names are just classes of pairs of canonical names and forcing conditions), making
the property of not adding new sets a trivial consequence. The problem with her approach is
however that one cannot actually prove that a given notion of class forcing does not add new sets
in her context (even if it is <Ord-closed), or to put it differently, to apply Gitman’s results to a
specific notion of forcing, one would first need to go through an argument, in the standard setting
that allows for the usual names for sets, that the notion of forcing under discussion does not add
new sets, thus verifying that the usual notion of generic extension corresponds with the one used
by Gitman in this case.
4. The Set Reduction Property
In this section, we introduce a weakening of the set decision property, that we call the set
reduction property, and verify that it is equivalent to the property that every new set added by P
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is already added by some set-size complete subforcing of P, and moreover that it still implies the
forcing theorem to hold for P.
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a fixed countable transitive model of GB−.
Notation. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M.
(1) We let Q≺◦P denote the statement that Q is a set-sized complete subforcing of P.
(2) Given p ∈ P and Q≺◦P, let Q‖p be the set of conditions in Q that are compatible with p in
P.
(3) We say that every new set added by P is added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P if
whenever G is P-generic over M and x ∈ M [G] \ M , then there is Q≺◦P such that x is
already an element of the induced Q-generic extension M [G¯] of M , where G¯ = G ∩Q.
We will show that any P with the property that every new set added by P is added by a set-sized
complete subforcing of P satisfies the forcing theorem, improving our result on the set decision
property from Section 3, and also generalizing a classical result of Zarach ([Zar73]), where he
showed that any notion of forcing that is the OrdM -length union of complete set-sized subforcings
satisfies the forcing theorem.3
Definition 4.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. We say that P satisfies the set reduction
property (over M) if whenever A ⊆ P is a set (in M) and p ∈ P, then there is q ≤P p and
Q≺◦P (in M) such that (∗)(A, q,Q) holds: for all a ∈ A, {r ∈ Q‖q | ∀s ≤P q, r (s ≤
∗
P a) or
∀s ≤P q, r (s ⊥P a)} is dense in Q
‖q.
Remark 4.2. The set decision property implies the set reduction property, as is witnessed by the
trivial forcing notion.
Definition 4.3. Given a notion of class forcing P for M, σ ∈ MP, Q≺◦P and q ∈ P, we define a
Q-name σQq , the q-reduction of σ to Q, by recursion as follows.
σQq = {〈τ
Q
q , r〉 | r ∈ Q ∧ ∃a [〈τ, a〉 ∈ σ ∧ ∀s ≤P q, r (s ≤
∗
P a)]}
Definition 4.4. Given a notion of class forcing P and a P-name σ, we define the conditions
appearing in (the transitive closure of) σ by induction on name rank as
tc(σ) =
⋃
{{p} ∪ tc(τ) | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for M, q ∈ P and Q≺◦P, suppose that
(∗)(A, q,Q) holds and let G be P-generic with q ∈ G. Then for every σ ∈ MP with tc(σ) ⊆ A,
σG = (σQq )
G¯, where G¯ = G ∩Q.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the name rank of σ. Suppose that τG ∈ σG, because there
is a ∈ G so that 〈τ, a〉 ∈ σ. Using (∗)(A, q,Q), we can find a condition r ∈ G¯ such that for
all s ≤P q, r, it holds that s ≤
∗
P a. Then 〈τ
Q
q , r〉 ∈ σ
Q
q and by induction, (τ
Q
q )
G¯ = τG, hence
τG ∈ (σQq )
G¯. If on the other hand (τQq )
G¯ ∈ (σQq )
G, because there is r ∈ G¯ such that ∃a 〈τ, a〉 ∈
σ ∧ ∀s ≤P q, r s ≤
∗
P a, then inductively τ
G = (τQq )
G¯ ∈ σG. 
Lemma 4.6. Every notion of class forcing P for M with the set reduction property satisfies the
forcing theorem.
Proof. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M with the set reduction property. We show that
{〈p, σ, τ〉 ∈ M | p P σ = τ} ∈ C, which suffices by [HKL
+16, Theorem 4.3]. Fix P-names σ and
τ and let A = tc(σ ∪ τ).
Claim 1. p P σ = τ ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤P p [∃Q≺◦P (∗)(A, q,Q)→ q P σ = τ ].
Proof. The left to right direction is immediate. For the right to left direction, note that D =
{q ≤P p | ∃Q≺◦P (∗)(A, q,Q)} ∈ C by first order class comprehension, and that D is dense below
p as a direct consequence of the set reduction property. 
3A generalization of this result in a different direction was also obtained in [HKL+16, Section 6].
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Claim 2. Assume that tc(σ) ∪ tc(τ) ⊆ A and (∗)(A, q,Q) holds. Then q P σ = τ if and only if
∀r0 ∈ Q
‖q ∃r1 ∈ Q
‖q(r1 ≤Q r0 ∧ r1 Q σ
Q
q = τ
Q
q .)
Proof. For the forward direction, assume that q P σ = τ and that r0 ∈ Q
‖q. Let G be P-generic
with r0, q ∈ G, hence σ
G = τG. Let G¯ denote the Q-generic induced by G, that is G¯ = G∩Q. By
Lemma 4.5, (σQq )
G¯ = (τQq )
G¯. Let r1 ≤Q r0 be a condition in G¯ forcing this. Then r1 ∈ Q
‖q and
r1 Q σ¯q = τ¯q.
For the backward direction, suppose that the right-hand side holds and let G be P-generic with
q ∈ G. Let G¯ = G ∩Q. Take r ∈ G¯ with r Q σ
Q
q = τ
Q
q . Then σ
G = τG by Lemma 4.5. Since G
was arbitrary, this means that q P σ = τ . 
Note that since Q is a notion of set forcing, it satisfies the forcing theorem, and thus the Q-
forcing relation is definable over M . Using the above claims, it is immediate that {〈p, σ, τ〉 ∈M |
p P σ = τ} is definable over 〈M,P,≤P〉, and is thus an element of C. 
Lemma 4.7. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. Then P has the set reduction property if
and only if every new set added by P is added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P.
Proof. The forward direction is immediate by Lemma 4.5. For the backward direction, let A ⊆ P
be a set of conditions and let σ = {〈aˇ, a〉 | a ∈ A}. Assume that every new set added by P is
added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P. However, suppose for a contradiction that P does
not have the set reduction property, as is witnessed by A ∈ M , i.e. there is p ∈ P such that for
every q ≤P p and every Q≺◦P in M , there is a ∈ A so that
D¯q,a = {r ∈ Q
‖q | ∀s ≤P q, r (s ≤
∗
P a) or ∀s ≤P q, r (s ⊥P a)}
is not dense in Q‖q. We want to use this assumption to find a P-generic filter G over M such that
σG does not lie in the induced Q-generic extension for any Q≺◦P, i.e. not every new set is added
by a set-sized complete subforcing.
We enumerate all dense subclasses of P which are in C (from the outside) by 〈Dn | n ∈ ω〉,
all Q≺◦P by 〈Qn | n ∈ ω〉 so that every Q≺◦P is enumerated unboundedly often, and we let
〈ρn | n ∈ ω〉 be so that each ρn is a Qn-name for a subset of A, and so that for every i ∈ ω, every
Qi-name ρ is enumerated as some ρn.
Now we define a decreasing sequence of conditions 〈qn | n ∈ ω〉 below p and a sequence
〈an | n ∈ ω〉 of conditions in A. Let q0 = p. Given qn ≤P p, we use our assumption to pick an ∈ A
such that D¯qn,an is not dense in Q
‖qn
n . We may thus pick r0 ∈ Q
‖qn
n such that no r1 ≤Qn r0 lies in
this set. Pick r1 ≤Qn r0 in Q
‖qn
n which decides whether or not aˇn ∈ ρn. This can be done because
if B is a maximal antichain, of conditions below r0 in Qn which decide whether or not aˇn ∈ ρn,
then B is also maximal below r0 in P, since Qn is a complete subforcing of P. In particular there
must be r1 ∈ B which is compatible with qn in P.
Since r1 6∈ D¯qn,an , we may now pick q˜n ≤P qn, r1 such that q˜n ⊥P an in case r1 Qn aˇn ∈ ρn,
and such that q˜n ≤
∗
P an in case r1 Qn aˇn 6∈ ρn. Now take qn+1 ≤P q˜n such that qn+1 ∈ Dn. In
the end, this constructions yields a P-generic filter G = {q ∈ P | ∃n ∈ ω (qn ≤P q)}. But since
every new set added by P is added by a set-sized complete subforcing by assumption, and since
1P P σ ⊆ Aˇ, there must be some n ∈ ω such that M [G] |= σ
G = ρG¯nn , where G¯n = G ∩ Qn.
But either qn+1 P aˇn ∈ ρn and an⊥Pqn+1, thus an /∈ σ
G, or qn+1 P aˇn /∈ ρn and qn+1 ≤
∗
P an,
implying that an ∈ σ
G. Thus σG 6= ρG¯nn , and we have reached a contradiction. 
Putting together Lemma 4.6 and 4.7 we obtain
Corollary 4.8. If P is a notion of class forcing such that every new set added by P is already
added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P, then P satisfies the Forcing Theorem.
5. Approachability by projections
In this short section, we want to generalize the property of the same name that was introduced
in [HKL+16, Section 6]. We want to use the very same name for this generalized property, as
we think that this new property is what approachability by projections should have been defined
as in the first place, while the property from [HKL+16, Section 6] should perhaps be renamed
as ordinal approachability by projections (see our below remarks). We start by isolating a strong
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projection property (this very same property was already used in [HKL+16, Section 6]). Note
that in the below, (1)–(3) are the usual defining properties of a projection.
Definition 5.1. Suppose that Q is a subforcing of P containing X as a subset of its domain. A
projection π : P→ Q respecting X is a function satisfying the following properties.
(1) π(1P) = 1P,
(2) ∀p, q ∈ P (p ≤P q → π(p) ≤P π(q)),
(3) ∀p ∈ P ∀q ≤Q π(p)∃r ≤P p (π(r) ≤P q),
(4) ∀p ∈ X ∀q ∈ P (π(q) ≤P p→ q ≤P p) and
(5) π is the identity on X .
Definition 5.2. Let M |= GB− and let P be a notion of class forcing for M. We say that
P = 〈P,≤P〉 is approachable by projections if there is a class Π ∈ C such that its sections πX,y =
{(u, v) | (X, y, u, v) ∈ Π} have the following property. For all subsets X of P, there is a set y and a
set-sized subforcing Q of P containing X ∪{1P} as a subset such that πX,y : P→ Q is a projection
respecting X .
Lemma 5.3. Let M |= GB−, let γ ∈ OrdM , let Y be a proper class of M and let P = Col(γ, Y )M .
Then P is approachable by projections.
Proof. For a subset X of P in M and y ∈ M , let rangeX :=
⋃
{range q | q ∈ X} and let πX,y be
trivial if y ∈ rangeX or if y 6∈ Y , and otherwise let it map p ∈ P to p¯ ∈ Col(γ, rangeX ∪ {y})
by sending p(i) to itself whenever p(i) ∈ rangeX ∪ {y} and sending it to y otherwise. Since X
is set-sized, there will be some y ∈ Y such that πX,y is nontrivial. Verifying that these πX,y are
projections respecting X is now an easy exercise that we will leave to the reader. 
Approachability by projections in the sense of [HKL+16, Section 6] is the special case when the
set-size subforcings Q of P are always required to be of the form Qα+1 for an increasing sequence
〈Qα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 ∈ C with union P. Our redefined property is strictly weaker than approachability
by projections in the sense of [HKL+16, Section 6]. For instance, the forcing notion Col(ω,P(ω))
is approachable by projections in the sense of this paper. It is not approachable by projections in
the sense of [HKL+16, Section 6] in a model of ZFC− with the property that every set is countable
and every set of reals has the property of Baire, since in such a model, there is no prewellordering of
ω2 of length Ord whose equivalence classes are sets. This follows easily from the Kuratowski-Ulam
theorem.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose that π : P→ Q is a projection respecting tc(σ ∪ τ) and p ∈ P. Then
p P σ ⊆ τ ⇔ π(p) Q σ ⊆ τ.
Proof. Like in the proof of [HKL+16, Theorem 6.4]. We leave the checking of the details to the
interested reader, as it boils down to a notational adaption of the original proof. Let us just say
that essentially Pα needs to be replaced by tc(σ ∪ τ), Pα+1 needs to be replaced by Q and πα+1
by π when adapting the proof. 
Corollary 5.5. If M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M that is approachable by
projections, then P satisfies the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4, we can define the forcing relation for equality, namely p P σ = τ iff there
is a set y and a set-sized subforcing Q of P such that π = πtc(σ∪τ),y is a projection from P to Q
that respects tc(σ ∪ τ) and such that π(p) Q σ = τ . Note that the latter is definable for Q is a
set-sized notion of forcing. This suffices by [HKL+16, Theorem 4.3]. 
6. How not to turn proper classes into sets
In this section, we will provide a collection of sufficient conditions ensuring that no proper class
of the ground model turns into a set in a generic class forcing extension. This will be contrasted
in the next section, where we provide a notion of class forcing that actually does turn a proper
class into a set. A central notion in this context will be that of bounded and unbounded names.
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Definition 6.1. If M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M, then we call a P-name σ
bounded if there is A ∈M such that
{σG | G is P-generic over M} ∩M ⊆ A.
We say that σ is an unbounded name otherwise. We say that P has bounded names (over M) if
there is no unbounded P-name σ ∈M .
This property is self-strengthening in the following sense.
Lemma 6.2. Assume that M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M that has bounded
names. Assume further that 〈σi | i ∈ I〉 ∈M is a sequence of P-names. Then there is a sequence
〈Ai | i ∈ I〉 such that
{σGi | G is P-generic over M} ∩M ⊆ Ai
for every i ∈ I.
Proof. Let 〈σi | i ∈ I〉 ∈ M be a sequence of P-names, such that σi = {〈τ
j
i , p
j
i 〉 | j ∈ Ji} for
every i ∈ I. Let σ = {〈op(τ ji , iˇ),1P〉 | i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji}. Since σ is a bounded name by assumption,
we may find A ∈ M such that {σG | G is P-generic over M} ∩ M ⊆ A. For every i ∈ I, let
Ai = {a | 〈a, i〉 ∈ A}. Then 〈Ai | i ∈ I〉 ∈M is easily seen to be as desired. 
Lemma 6.3. If M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M that has bounded names, then
no proper class X of M is turned into a set by forcing with P.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that σ ∈ M is such that σG = X for some proper class X of
M and some P-generic filter G over M. Write σ as σ = {〈τi, pi〉 | i ∈ I}. By the bounded names
property, we find 〈Ai | i ∈ I〉 such that for every i ∈ I and every P-generic filter H over M,
τHi ∈ Ai. But this implies that X = σ
G ⊆
⋃
i∈I Ai ∈M for every P-generic filter G over M. Using
separation for the predicate X in M, we obtain that X ∈ M , contradicting that X is a proper
class of M. 
Lemma 6.4. If M |= GB and P is a notion of class forcing for M, then P has bounded names.
Proof. Let σ be a P-name in M , of rank less than α. By a standard argument (in V), we know
that the rank of σG is less than α for any P-generic filter G over M. Hence if σG ∈ M , then
σG ∈Mα, and Mα ∈M by the power set axiom in M, hence σ is a bounded name. 
Lemma 6.5. If M |= GB− and P ∈M is a notion of set forcing, then P has bounded names.
Proof. Let σ be a P-name in M . Whenever σG = z ∈M for some P-generic filter G over M, then
there is p ∈ P forcing that σ = zˇ. Hence σ is a bounded name by replacement in M. 
Next we consider approachability by projections.
Lemma 6.6. If M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M that is approachable by
projections, then P has bounded names.
Proof. Let σ be a P-name in M . Using approachability by projections, let Q ⊇ tc(σ) be set-sized
and let π : P → Q be a projection respecting tc(σ). Since P satisfies the forcing theorem by
[citation], for any possible value z of σG for some P-generic filter G over M, there is p ∈ P forcing
that σ = zˇ. By Lemma 5.4, π(p)  σ = zˇ. But π(p) ∈ Q, i.e. any possible value of σ is decided by
a condition in the set-sized forcing notion Q, so σ is a bounded name by replacement in M. 
In Section 4, we introduced the set reduction property and showed that for a notion of class
forcing P, this property is equivalent to the property that every new set added by P is in fact
added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P. We now show that this property ensures that no
proper class is turned into a set.
Lemma 6.7. If M |= GB− and P is a notion of class forcing for M such that every new set is
added by a set-sized complete subforcing of P, then no proper class X of M is turned into a set by
forcing with P.
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Proof. If X were a new set in some P-generic extension of M, then it would have a Q-name
σ ∈ M for some set-sized complete subforcing Q of P. Assume 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ. Using the forcing
theorem, which holds by [citation], any possible value of τ in a Q-generic extension is forced by
some condition q ∈ Q. Using that Q is set-sized, we can cover the possible values of τ by a set
in M. But then we can cover σG for any P-generic G over M by a single set in M. Pick G such
that σG = X . Using separation for the predicate X implies that X ∈M , contradicting that X is
a proper class of M. 
Lemma 6.8. If M |= GB− and P is a pretame notion of class forcing for M, then no proper class
X of M is turned into a set by forcing with P.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that σ ∈M is a P-name for some proper classX ofM. Note that
P satisfies the forcing theorem by [HKS17, Theorem 2.4], so there is p ∈ P such that p  σ = Xˇ .
For 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σ, let D〈τ,r〉 = {d ∈ P | d ‖ τ}. Applying pretameness of P, we may find q ≤ p and
〈d〈τ,r〉 | 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σ〉 such that each d〈τ,r〉 ⊆ D〈τ,r〉 is set-sized and predense below q. But this means
that q forces a set-sized ground model cover for σ, contradicting that q ≤ p forces that σ = Xˇ. 
If M |= GB− and thinks that each of its elements is countable, then there is a notion of class
forcing for M that is pretame and does not add any new sets, however has an unbounded name:
Definition 6.9. Let P denote the forcing whose conditions are (not necessarily finite) partial
functions from ω to 2, ordered by reverse inclusion – equivalently, one may consider P to be the
full support iteration of length ω of the lottery sum of {0, 1}, ordered naturally.
Lemma 6.10. There is a P-name σ such that for all x ⊆ ω in M , there is a P-generic filter G
over M with σG = x.
Proof. Let σ = {〈nˇ, {〈n, 1〉}〉 | n ∈ ω}. Pick some x ⊆ ω in M . Since x∗ = {〈n, 1〉 | n ∈ x} is an
atom of P, G = {p ∈ P | p ⊆ x∗} is a P-generic filter over M that satisfies σG = x. 
Remark 6.11. If a notion of class forcing satisfies the forcing theorem, it does not necessarily have
bounded names: A counterexample is provided by P and M above. P satisfies the forcing theorem
over M by Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.5, since it does not add new sets. Lemma 6.10 shows that σ
is an unbounded P-name over M.
7. How to turn a proper class into a set
We will show that over a model M of ZF− which thinks that all sets are countable, one can
perform a fairly simple class forcing that turns the reals of M (which are a proper class of M
by the proof of Cantor’s diagonalization argument performed within M) into a set in its generic
extensions.
Let Q be the finite support product of ω-many copies of the notion of class forcing P from
Definition 6.9. We claim that forcing with Q turns the reals of M into a set in any of its generic
extensions. Moreover, we will show that Q does not satisfy the forcing theorem. This provides
easier alternative witnesses for [HKL+16, Theorem 1.3], that is notions of class forcing which fail
to satisfy the forcing theorem, however only over certain models of ZF−.
Lemma 7.1. There is a Q-name τ such that for every Q-generic filter G over M ,
τG = P(ω)M .
Proof. For i < ω, let τi = {〈nˇ, {〈〈i, n〉, 1〉}〉 | n ∈ ω}, that is τi is the canonical Q-name for the
real chosen in its ith iterand. Note that each τi is an unbounded name. Let τ = {〈τi, 1〉 | i ∈ ω}.
For every x : ω → 2 in M , the set
Dx = {〈p0, . . . , pk〉 ∈ Q | k ∈ ω ∧ ∃i ≤ k pi = x}
is dense in Q. Hence τG = P(ω)M for every Q-generic filter G over M . 
Col(ω,P(ω))M is clearly isomorphic to a dense subforcing of Q. However we will close this
section by showing that (unlike Col(ω,P(ω))M , by Corollary 5.5), Q does not satisfy the forcing
theorem (of course, Col(ω,P(ω))M , being approachable by projections, also fails to turn a proper
class of M into a set, by Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.3).
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Theorem 7.2. Q does not satisfy the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that Q does satisfy the forcing theorem over M. We show that
we can use this assumption to define a first order truth predicate over M which will clearly be a
contradiction. We will start by using this assumption to define a truth predicate for the two-sorted
structure S = 〈P(ω)M , ω,∈,=, <,+, ·〉 of second order arithmetic.
We will translate first order formulas over S into infinitary quantifier-free formulae in the forcing
language of Q so that truth over S of instances of the former corresponds to forcing respective
instances of the latter. The infinitary language LOrd,0(Q,M) is built up from the atomic formulae
qˇ ∈ G˙, σ ∈ τ and σ = τ for q ∈ Q and σ, τ ∈MP, the negation operator and set-sized conjunctions
and disjunctions. This language originates from [HKL+16, Section 5], where also a more detailed
description of this language may be found.
Now inductively, we assign to every first order formula ϕ over S with free variables for natural
numbers in {u0, . . . , uk−1}, free variables for reals in {v0, . . . , vl−1} and all ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1 ∈ ω
k
and ~α = α0, . . . , αl−1 ∈ ω
l an LOrd,0(Q,M)-formula in the following way. If t is any S-term, let
t(u0, . . . , uk−1)
∗
~α,~n = t(nˇ0, . . . , ˇnk−1). For the sake of simplicity, from now on we only consider
formulas that only involve trivial terms (and nontrivial terms would need to be handled as above).
(ui < uj)
∗
~α,~n = (nˇi < nˇj)
(ui ∈ vj)
∗
~α,~n = (nˇi ∈ σαj )
(¬ϕ)∗~α,~n = (¬ϕ
∗
~α,~n)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~α,~n = (ϕ
∗
~α,~n ∨ ψ
∗
~α,~n)
(∃vkϕ)
∗
~α,~n = (
∨
i<ω
ϕ∗~α⌢i,~n).
Note that by [HKL+16, Lemma 5.2], if Q satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or
“v0 = v1”, then it satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all infinitary formulae in the forcing
language of Q. The following claim will thus allow us to define a truth predicate for first-order
formulas over S.
Claim 3. For every first-order formula ϕ over S with free variables for natural numbers among
{u0, . . . , uk−1} and free variables for reals among {v0, . . . , vl−1} and for all ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1 ∈ ω
k
and all sequences of reals ~r = r0, . . . , rl−1 in M , the following statements are equivalent:
(1) S |= ϕ(~r, ~n).
(2) ∀~α ∈ ωl ∀q ∈ Q q Q “∀i < l σαi = rˇi”→ q Q ϕ
∗
~α,~n.
(3) ∃~α ∈ ωl ∃q ∈ Q q Q “∀i < l σαi = rˇi” ∧ q Q ϕ
∗
~α,~n.
Proof. Observe that since for any Q-generic filter G over M, {σGi | i < ω} = P(ω)
M , (2) always
implies (3). We will show the equivalence of (1), (2) and (3) by induction on formula complexity.
For formulas of the form “ui < uj” this is obvious. Consider formulas of the form “ui ∈ vj”.
Suppose first that ni ∈ rj . Let α < ω and q ∈ Q with q P σα = rˇj . Take a Q-generic filter with
q ∈ G. But then obviously q P nˇi ∈ σα, i.e. (2) holds.
Assume now that (3) holds, i.e. there is α < ω and q ∈ Q such that q Q σα = rˇj and
q Q nˇi ∈ σα. Then q Q nˇi ∈ rˇj , i.e. ni ∈ rj in M [G] whenever G is Q-generic over M, and by
absoluteness, this statement holds true in S, i.e. (1) holds.
The cases of negations and disjunctions are treated in a fairly standard way, exactly as in the
proof of [HKS17, Theorem 2.6, Claim 2].
We are thus left with the case of existential quantification. Assume first that S |= ∃vlϕ(~r
⌢vl, ~n).
Pick y ∈ P(ω)M such that S |= ϕ(~x⌢y, ~n) and let ~α ∈ ωl and q ∈ Q with q P ∀i < l σαi = rˇi.
Let G be Q-generic with q ∈ G. Then there is t ≤Q q and β < ω with t ∈ G and t P σβ = yˇ.
By induction, r Q ϕ
∗
~α⌢β,~n. In particular, M [G] |= (∃vkϕ)
∗
~α,~n. The converse follows in a similar
way. 
Using the above claim together with the assumption of the forcing theorem, we obtain a truth
predicate for S definably over M . But then by the usual translation between Hω1 and the reals,
we obtain from this a truth predicate for M that is definable over M , contradicting Tarski’s
undefinability of truth. 
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[HKS17, Theorem 1.12] gives a list of many desirable properties of notions of class forcing
which are – under additional assumptions on the ground model – equivalent to pretameness. For
example, pretameness can be characterized in terms of the forcing theorem and the existence of a
Boolean completion. In order to state these equivalences, we need the following.
Notation. LetM |= GB− and let Ψ be some property of a notion of class forcing P forM = 〈M, C〉.
We say that P densely satisfies Ψ if every notion of class forcing Q for M, for which there is a
dense embedding in C from P into Q, satisfies the property Ψ.
[HKS17, Theorem 1.12] for example states that – under certain conditions on the ground model
– a forcing notion is pretame iff it densely satisfies the forcing theorem. The following result yields
yet another charachterization of pretameness of this kind.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose that M |= GBC− such that M contains a largest cardinal κ. If P is a notion
of class forcing for M which is non-pretame but satisfies the forcing theorem, then there is a notion
of class forcing Q such that P is dense in Q and forcing with Q turns a proper class into a set.
Proof. Suppose that P is a non-pretame notion of class forcing for M. By [HKS17, Lemma
2.7], the class of all p ∈ P such that there is an ordinal α and a class name F˙ with p P
“ F˙ : αˇ→ OrdM”is surjective” is dense. Using the existence of a global well-order of order-type
OrdM , we may assume that 1P P “ F˙ : αˇ→ P(κ)
M”is surjective”. Now we extend P to a forcing
notion Q by formally adding the suprema of the classes
Dβ,λ = {p ∈ P | p P λˇ ∈ F˙ (βˇ)}.
for β < α and x ∈ P(κ). More precisely, let Q = P ∪ {pβ,λ | β < α, λ < κ}, where each pβ,λ does
not lie in P. We can then order Q by
pβ,λ ≤Q p⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Dβ,λ, (q ≤P p),
p ≤Q pβ,λ ⇐⇒ Dβ,λ is predense below p in P,
pβ,λ ≤Q pβ′,λ′ ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Dβ,λ (q ≤Q pβ′,λ′)
for p ∈ P and β, β′ < α and λ, λ′ < κ. By construction, P is a dense subforcing of Q. For β < α
we define
σβ = {〈λˇ, pβ,λ〉 | λ < κ}
σ = {〈σβ ,1P〉 | β < α}.
Now let G be Q-generic over M.
Claim. σG = P(κ)M .
Proof. Let β < α. Then λ ∈ σGβ iff pβ,λ ∈ G iff λ ∈ F˙
G(β). Hence σGβ = F˙
G(β) ∈ P(κ)M . This
proves the claim, since F˙G is surjective. 
Since P(κ)M is a proper class in M, it follows from the claim above that Q turns a proper class
into a set. 
Note that a similar argument as the one given in the proof of Theorem 7.2 shows that the
forcing notion Q in the proof of Lemma 7.3 does not satisfy the forcing theorem. Using Lemmata
6.8 and 7.3 we obtain the following characterization of pretameness:
Theorem 7.4. Suppose that M |= GBC− such that M contains a largest cardinal κ. Then a notion
of forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem is pretame for M if and only if it densely does
not turn proper classes into sets. 
8. Open Questions
In Section 6, we show that all known properties of forcing notions which imply the forcing
theorem (except, of course, the forcing theorem itself) prevent proper classes from being turned
into sets in generic extensions. A natural question is therefore the following:
Question 8.1. Does the forcing theorem imply that no proper class in the ground model is turned
into a set in the generic extension?
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By now, we know a range of combinatorial properties that imply the forcing theorem to hold,
however we do not know a combinatorial characterization of the forcing theorem itself.
Question 8.2. Is there a combinatorial property that holds for a notion of class forcing P exactly
if P satisfies the forcing theorem?
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